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UNBUNDLING FEDERALISM: 
COLORADO’S LEGALIZATION OF 
MARIJUANA AND FEDERALISM’S MANY 
FORMS 
JESSICA BULMAN-POZEN* 
This short Essay argues that various attributes we associate 
with federalism should not be deemed necessary components of 
federalism as a definitional or normative matter. Using 
Colorado’s recent legalization of marijuana as a case study, it 
shows how two such attributes—an autonomous realm of state 
action and independent state officials with distinctive 
interests—can be pulled apart. State officials often further their 
interests and effectively oppose federal policy when they 
participate in the same statutory scheme as federal actors 
instead of operating in a separate, autonomous sphere. At the 
same time, state officials frequently rely on the autonomous 
lawmaking and executive powers of state governments to 
advance a decidedly national agenda, acting in cooperation 
with federal officials rather than independently of them. 
Unbundling federalism helps us get a purchase on these 
pervasive practices instead of dismissing them as not-
federalism. 
INTRODUCTION 
As we convene in Colorado on the one-year anniversary of 
the state’s legalization of marijuana, it seems only fitting to 
consider what this unfolding example may illuminate about 
American federalism in the early twenty-first century. On one 
account, a distinctive community—the western, libertarian 
 
*  Associate Professor, Columbia Law School. This Essay was prepared for the Ira 
C. Rothgerber, Jr. Conference on Constitutional Law held at the University of 
Colorado Law School from November 7 to 8, 2013. For stimulating conversations, 
I am grateful to my fellow conference participants—Ming Hsu Chen, Heather 
Gerken, Abbe Gluck, Melissa Hart, Sam Kamin, Amanda Leiter, Marc Poirier, 
Erin Ryan, and Ernie Young—and to Henry Monaghan and David Pozen. I also 
thank the editors of the University of Colorado Law Review for their excellent 
editorial suggestions. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2366388 
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people of Colorado—has used the State’s sovereign lawmaking 
capacity to stake out a position different from the federal 
government’s. And not just different—Colorado has picked a 
fight with Washington, D.C., by adopting a policy that conflicts 
with federal law and is overtly and deliberately oppositional. 
This account embraces the classic tropes of federalism: 
Sovereignty! Popular participation! Laboratories! Local 
community! State-federal contestation!1 
On another account, however, something very different has 
occurred. National organizations and individuals across the 
country have advanced a national agenda in a state forum. 
Federal politicians and administrators have welcomed the 
state’s choice instead of opposing it. And Colorado’s legalization 
of marijuana is, as a practical matter, determining the content 
of federal drug law rather than standing beyond it. This 
account calls into question many of the classic tropes of 
federalism: Out-of-state actors shaping state politics? 
Intertwined state and federal authority? States as authors of 
federal law? 
It may be tempting to choose between these stories and to 
proclaim American federalism either alive or dead, but there is 
truth in both accounts. It was the people of Colorado—not the 
people of Mississippi, or North Dakota, or the United States as 
a whole—who voted to legalize marijuana; and yet the vast 
majority of funds for the initiative came from outside the 
state.2 State and federal law now take opposing positions on 
marijuana; and yet state and federal enforcement regimes are 
 
 1. On some of these tropes, see, for example, DAVID L. SHAPIRO, 
FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 107–40 (1995); Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and 
Federalism, 96 YALE. L.J. 1425 (1987); Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. 
Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1260–61 (2009); Deborah 
Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third 
Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7 (1988); Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s 
Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 53–63 (2004); and Michael W. McConnell, 
Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484 (1987) 
(book review). 
 2. See, e.g., John Ingold, Colorado Marijuana-Legalization Amendment 
Spending Tops $3 Million, DENVER POST, Oct. 21, 2012, http://www.denverpost. 
com/ci_21820068/colorado-marijuana-legalization-amendment-spending-tops-3-
million (“[B]oth sides report receiving more financial support from outside the 
state than from inside it.”); Amendment 64: Legalizing Marijuana: Ballot Measure 
Summary, NAT’L INST. ON MONEY IN STATE POL., http://www.followthemoney.org/ 
database/StateGlance/ballot.phtml?m=956 (last visited Mar. 5, 2014) (showing 
that committees in favor of the ballot initiative raised nearly $3.5 million, of 
which more than $3.2 million came from out-of-state sources). 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2366388 
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so interwoven that state law shapes how federal law is carried 
out.3 Colorado’s sovereign lawmaking has catalyzed a fight 
about the United States’ war on drugs; and yet this fight does 
not pit state against federal actors but instead one group of 
both state and federal actors against a different group of both 
state and federal actors.4 
Recognizing that each account captures something about 
Colorado’s legalization of marijuana suggests a deeper point 
about contemporary American federalism. Much state activity 
today strains our traditional definition of federalism as a 
system of coexisting state and federal governments, each with 
independent government officials and a sphere of autonomous 
authority untouched by the other.5 Time and again, we see 
state and federal action occurring in overlapping, rather than 
separate, spheres. Time and again, we see state and federal 
officials using their respective authority to advance a single 
national agenda, rather than distinct state and federal 
agendas. Time and again, we see individuals across the country 
participating in the politics of states in which they do not 
reside. These practices need not, however, yield the conclusion 
 
 3. See Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., to all United 
States Att’ys 2 (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/ 
3052013829132756857467.pdf (“[T]he federal government has traditionally relied 
on states and local law enforcement agencies to address marijuana activity 
through enforcement of their own narcotics laws.”). See generally Michael M. 
O’Hear, Federalism and Drug Control, 57 VAND. L. REV. 783 (2004) (describing 
national drug policy as a cooperative federalism program involving federal 
reliance on state enforcement). 
 4. For instance, the Drug Enforcement Administration continues to insist 
that marijuana is properly criminalized, see THE DEA POSITION ON MARIJUANA 
(2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/dea/docs/marijuana_position_2011.pdf, 
while some members of Congress have introduced bills in support of legalization, 
see, e.g., H.R. 499, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 1523, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 5. See, e.g., JENNA BEDNAR, THE ROBUST FEDERATION 18–19 (2009) (defining 
federalism in terms of geopolitical division of a federation into mutually exclusive 
states; independent bases of state and federal authority; and constitutionally 
declared sovereignty of both state and federal governments in at least one policy 
realm); WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM 11 (1964) (“A constitution is federal if (1) 
two levels of government rule the same land and people, (2) each level has at least 
one area of action in which it is autonomous, and (3) there is some guarantee . . . 
of the autonomy of each government in its own sphere.”); Daniel Halberstam, 
Federalism: A Critical Guide 6, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1924939 (defining federalism in terms of “the coexistence 
within a compound polity of multiple levels of government each with 
constitutionally grounded claims to some degree of organizational autonomy and 
jurisdictional authority”). 
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that we are living in a post-federalist era.6 
Instead, we might think more seriously about unbundling 
federalism. Sometimes the various attributes we assign to 
states—in particular, an autonomous realm of action and 
officials who advance distinctive state interests—travel 
together and our traditional definitions of federalism fit 
comfortably. But often these attributes travel separately. State 
officials may assert their distinctive interests by operating 
within, rather than outside of, federal administrative schemes, 
for example, or they may rely on their autonomous lawmaking 
capacity to advance a national political platform. Unbundling 
federalism helps us get purchase on these pervasive practices 
instead of dismissing them as not-federalism. 
Work in related areas underscores that unbundling can be 
a rewarding move.7 It also underscores that “unbundling” can 
mean many things. Here, I use the term to indicate that a 
variety of attributes associated with federalism should not be 
deemed necessary components of federalism as a definitional or 
normative matter. Unbundling therefore prompts us to 
consider how American federalism may operate even in the 
absence of commonly assumed features. In this short Essay, I 
can only just begin to unbundle federalism, but I hope this 
might be a generative, or at least provocative, start.8 
 
 6. For a strong variant of that argument, see MALCOLM M. FEELEY & 
EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM (2008). 
 7. See Richard Primus, Unbundling Constitutionality, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1079 (2013) (arguing that constitutionality should be thought of as a bundle of 
sticks rather than as a status with necessary conditions, and that no single 
attribute should be deemed either necessary or sufficient for conferring 
constitutional status on a rule); see also Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, 
The Unbundled Executive, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1385 (2008) (exploring the possibility 
of a plural executive regime in which discrete authorities are parceled out among 
various directly elected executive officials); Benjamin I. Sachs, The Unbundled 
Union: Politics Without Collective Bargaining, 123 YALE L.J. 148 (2013) 
(proposing that labor law should allow employees to organize politically without 
also organizing economically for collective bargaining purposes). 
For works recognizing more than one variant of American federalism, see, for 
example, Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of Federalism: “Converse-1983” in Context, 
47 VAND. L. REV. 1229 (1994); Randy E. Barnett, Three Federalisms, 39 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 285 (2008); Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1549 (2012); Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory 
Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and 
Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534 (2011); and Deborah Jones Merritt, Three Faces of 
Federalism: Finding a Formula for the Future, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1563 (1994). 
 8. For instance, while I here take states to be the relevant unit of federalism 
analysis, future work might unbundle federalism’s insistence on states. For a 
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In what follows, I pull apart two of the attributes most 
often ascribed to states: an autonomous sphere of action and 
independent officials with distinctive interests. State officials 
frequently further their particular interests and effectively 
oppose federal policy when they participate in the same 
statutory scheme as federal actors instead of operating in a 
separate, autonomous sphere. At the same time, state officials 
frequently rely on the autonomous legislative and executive 
powers of state governments to advance a decidedly national 
agenda, acting in cooperation with federal officials rather than 
independently of them. In each case, appreciating the contours 
of today’s federalism requires us to distinguish an autonomous 
state sphere from independent state officials and to recognize 
that neither is a necessary attribute of American federalism. 
Once we unbundle this far, moreover, we can appreciate that 
both autonomy and independence are multifarious concepts 
and that today’s federalism may involve varying degrees of 
each—or, to adapt the title of this symposium, our unbundling 
of federalism may need to run “all the way down.” 
I. INDEPENDENT INTERESTS WITHOUT AUTONOMOUS ACTION 
Vast swaths of American federalism involve joint state-
federal regulation rather than separate spheres of state and 
federal action. States implement federal law in areas ranging 
from social welfare programs like Medicaid, Social Security, 
and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; to 
environmental programs like the Clean Air Act and the Clean 
Water Act; to a variety of other schemes, such as immigration, 
consumer protection, telecommunications, and financial 
regulation.9 Even as the courts have blessed such cooperative 
 
sample of the burgeoning literature arguing that non-state units, especially cities, 
have strong claims to come within federalism’s ambit, see Heather K. Gerken, 
Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2010); Loren King, 
Cities, Subsidiarity, and Federalism, NOMOS LV: FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY 
(forthcoming June 2014); and Daniel Weinstock, Cities and Federalism, NOMOS 
LV: FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY (forthcoming June 2014). See generally 
Richard Briffault, “What About the ‘Ism’?” Normative and Formal Concerns in 
Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303 (1994) (arguing that a 
normative rather than structural approach to federalism moves the focus away 
from states to local governments). 
 9. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006) (immigration); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 
(2006) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2006) (Medicaid); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–
7642 (2006) (Clean Air Act); 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(5) (2006) (telecommunications); 
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federalism programs,10 they have continued to describe the 
states as sovereigns operating in an autonomous realm.11 In 
the recent healthcare case, for instance, the Chief Justice’s 
controlling opinion insisted that “[t]he states are separate and 
independent sovereigns” while discussing Medicaid, a program 
in which states administer federal law, relying on federal funds 
and subject to federal superintendence.12 
As scholars have noted, a vocabulary of separateness and 
autonomy is inapt when it comes to cooperative federalism. 
Rather than view “each jurisdiction as a separate entity that 
regulates in its own distinct sphere of authority without 
coordinating with the other,” we can only wrap our heads 
around cooperative federalism programs if we accept that they 
entail “a sharing of regulatory authority between the federal 
government and the states that allows states to regulate within 
a framework delineated by federal law.”13 To understand 
cooperative federalism, that is, we must engage in a project of 
unbundling—we must pull out of our usual federalism bundle 
the insistence on an autonomous state sphere. In cooperative 
federalism programs, there is no autonomous state sphere, only 
overlapping, intertwined state and federal domains. 
The absence of a separate state domain does not mean 
states are powerless actors. Cooperative programs may 
facilitate “uncooperative federalism” as states use the power 
conferred on them by federal law to push back against federal 
 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 1042(a)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 2012–14 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5552) 
(financial regulation); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-148, §§ 1101, 1311, 1321, 124 Stat. 119, 141–143, 173–179, 186 (2010) (to be 
codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 18001, 18031, 18041) (healthcare). 
 10. As long as they elicit voluntary state participation. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of 
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J., 
joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 
(1992); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 764 (1982); Hodel v. Va. Surface 
Mining Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981). 
 11. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York, 505 U.S. 
at 144. 
 12. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2603 (opinion of Roberts, C.J., 
joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ). 
 13. Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative 
Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 665 (2001); see also, e.g., DANIEL J. ELAZAR, 
AMERICAN FEDERALISM (2d ed. 1972); MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN 
SYSTEM (1966); ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN (2012); 
Gluck, supra note 7; Joseph F. Zimmerman, National-State Relations: Cooperative 
Federalism in the Twentieth Century, 31 PUBLIUS 15 (2001). 
BULMAN-POZEN_FINAL 5/31/2014  2:39 PM 
2014] UNBUNDLING FEDERALISM 1073 
objectives.14 To the extent they have distinctive interests,15 
then, states may advance those interests from within 
cooperative federalism schemes rather than solely from 
separate spheres of autonomous state action. When Arizona 
recently objected to federal immigration policy,16 for example, 
its most successful opposition followed directly from the role 
Congress has given states in the federal scheme. Federal law 
contemplates that states will seek to determine the 
immigration status of individuals within their borders, and it 
requires the Department of Homeland Security to respond to 
such state inquiries.17 Incorporating this provision into section 
2 of its controversial law, Arizona seized on the assumed 
cooperation of state and federal officials to advance a decidedly 
uncooperative position.18 Notably, section 2 was the only 
provision of the state law to survive a preemption challenge 
before the Supreme Court, suggesting that uncooperative 
federalism may be not only an effective way for states to 
further their independent interests but, at least in some cases, 
the only way.19 
Indeed, in many areas in which the federal government is 
the dominant actor—and would likely exercise sole authority 
 
 14. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 1; see also Jessica Bulman-Pozen, 
Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of Powers, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 459 
(2012) [hereinafter Federalism as a Safeguard] (considering how states 
administering cooperative federalism programs push back against the federal 
executive branch in particular); Gerken, supra note 8, at 35 (emphasizing the 
states’ “power of the servant”). 
 15. I am skeptical about the existence of distinctive state versus national 
interests, as the remainder of this Essay and some of my prior work suggest. See, 
e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077 (2014). 
The point here, however, is that, to the extent these interests do exist, states may 
advance them not only through an autonomous sphere of action, but also through 
their role in federal statutory schemes. 
 16. See generally Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (considering 
a challenge to portions of Arizona’s S.B. 1070 immigration law). 
 17. See 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2006). 
 18. Section 2 of Arizona’s law requires state officers to determine the 
immigration status of arrestees by verifying their status with the federal 
government, as 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) contemplates. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-
1051(B) (2010). In back-to-back sentences in section 1 of the law, the state 
legislature declares its intent to be realizing “cooperative enforcement of federal 
immigration laws throughout all of Arizona” and, at the same time, ensuring that 
the public policy of Arizona (in contrast to the public policy of the United States) 
is “attrition through enforcement.” Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe 
Neighborhoods Act, § 1, ch. 113, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1070, as amended by Act of 
Apr. 30, 2010, ch. 211, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 2162. 
 19. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2492. 
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were state and federal action deemed mutually exclusive—
states have relied on their administrative role to challenge 
federal policy. From state resistance to the USA PATRIOT Act 
and federal environmental policy to state reshaping of federal 
welfare policy and the No Child Left Behind Act, examples 
abound of states acting uncooperatively in cooperative 
federalism schemes.20 
That states exercise power in cooperative federalism 
schemes is, in many ways, no surprise. It is a federalism-based 
spin on the principal-agent problem familiar to many areas of 
the law—and a spin that suggests a possible normative upside 
to the classic problem.21 The slack in the system allows states 
to advance their positions, and to challenge federal policy, even 
while they are legally subordinate actors. Because the federal 
government depends on the states to achieve its objectives, 
states are able to prioritize within, push back against, and even 
subvert federal law.22 Closely related, states have the power to 
set the agenda through their implementation choices, and this 
forces federal actors to engage with states in a reactive posture 
rather than always having the power of inertia on their side.23 
As insiders to the federal scheme, states also possess 
knowledge and connections that facilitate their challenges to 
federal policy.24 Even while they are insiders in important 
respects, however, states remain outside the federal apparatus 
in others. Most notably, state officials enjoy an independent 
power base: their constituencies are state voters or other state 
officials, not federal officials.25 
 
 20. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 1, at 1274–82. 
 21. See id. at 1262–64; Gerken, supra note 8, at 65–68. Regarding 
uncooperative federalism as an attractive phenomenon depends on privileging 
federalism values of state contestation and dissent. If one is focused on a different 
set of concerns, say good policy outcomes, uncooperative federalism may look just 
like any other principal-agent problem. 
 22. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 1, at 1266–68; cf. John P. Dwyer, 
The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183 (1995) 
(discussing federal reliance on accumulated state institutional competence and 
expertise); Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 
1544 (1994) (arguing that the federal government’s reliance on the states 
“guarantees state officials a voice in the process”); Weiser, supra note 13, at 671 
(noting that states “exercise considerable discretion” in cooperative federalism 
schemes and that federal reliance on state implementation makes the states “very 
influential in practice”). 
 23. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 1, at 1287. 
 24. See id. at 1268–70. 
 25. See id. at 1270–71. While many state officials who implement federal 
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Uncooperative federalism thus underscores that state 
independence and state autonomy need not travel together. It 
is the fact that state officials are independent of federal 
officials that facilitates, and often motivates, their opposition to 
federal policy. When state voters have different interests from 
the national electorate, state officials may advance these 
distinct interests. But these state officials are opposing federal 
policy as they carry out federal law, rather than opposing 
federal policy from outside of a federal scheme. Taking 
uncooperative federalism seriously requires us to remove 
autonomy from federalism’s bundle and to recognize that 
federalism may involve independence without autonomy. 
II. AUTONOMOUS ACTION WITHOUT INDEPENDENT INTERESTS 
If contemporary federalism sometimes involves state 
independence without a realm of autonomy, so too does it 
sometimes involve state autonomy without independent state 
and federal officials. Uncooperative federalism suggests that 
states may advance their distinctive agendas from within 
federal schemes. Other aspects of our federalism, meanwhile, 
reveal that state and federal officials may use their 
autonomous legislative and executive authorities to advance a 
single agenda. State autonomy becomes a vehicle for furthering 
a particular view of national policy, not for ensuring state-
federal separateness. 
Let me be clear about the kind of state independence I am 
focusing on here. I have spoken of state and federal officials 
enjoying separate bases of power, and I do not mean to 
challenge that structural independence. Independently elected 
or appointed officials may be an irreducible core of federalism—
or at least a feature that I am not prepared to jettison in these 
few pages. But conceptions of independent state and federal 
officials tend to assume that these independent electoral bases 
yield state and federal officials who are independent in a 
deeper sense—who have distinctive interests, commitments, 
and agendas. It is this stronger form of state-federal 
independence I mean to put under the microscope here. 
 
programs are bureaucrats, others are state politicians. It is state politicians who 
tend to generate the most vociferous opposition to federal policy, as the examples 
in the text suggest. 
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Many aspects of contemporary American politics and 
culture pose a challenge to the idea of independent state actors 
with distinctive interests standing apart from federal officials 
and one another.26 New technologies have made it ever easier 
to communicate, travel, and organize across state lines. 
Doctrinal developments with respect to the Privileges and 
Immunities and dormant Commerce Clauses and the First 
Amendment have rendered state borders more porous.27 
Partisan politics has made the entire country a single 
battleground for partisan struggle. For these and other 
reasons, state officials often have commitments and agendas 
indistinguishable from their federal counterparts. And state 
and federal officials frequently work together, either directly or 
through various political organizations and ideological 
networks, to achieve their ends. 
Although this dynamic extends more broadly, it is clearest 
with respect to partisan politics. State and federal political 
actors today use both state and federal governments to 
articulate, stage, and amplify competition between the 
Democratic and Republican parties.28 Because today’s parties 
are more ideologically cohesive and polarized than in the 
past—and because this is true at both the federal and state 
levels—states are critical sites of national partisan 
competition. Rather than independent state officials advancing 
state interests against national interests, state and federal 
officials together advance a set of ultimately national 
interests.29 
Two points about such “partisan federalism” bear 
emphasis here. First, while I have suggested that state and 
 
 26. See, e.g., JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 69–72 
(2005); ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM 16–26 (2009); cf. PING 
REN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, LIFETIME MOBILITY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2010, at 4 
tbl. 2 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/acsbr10-07.pdf 
(showing that more than half of Americans age twenty-five and older do not live 
in their state of birth). 
 27. See, e.g., Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987) (holding that whether 
material is obscene must be evaluated under a reasonable person standard rather 
than a community-specific standard); Supreme Court v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985) 
(holding that a state rule limiting bar admission to state residents violated the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 
617 (1978) (holding that a state law banning use of waste disposal sites for waste 
originating in other states violated the dormant Commerce Clause). 
 28. Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, supra note 15. 
 29. Id. 
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federal officials alike advance national interests, partisanship 
means that there is not one single national agenda. Instead, 
there are competing interests and policy positions. We do, 
therefore, witness competition between certain state and 
federal actors, but this competition is not motivated by their 
state and federal roles; it is motivated by partisan 
commitments. Democratic officials in Massachusetts may 
challenge a federal Republican administration, while 
Republican officials in Texas may challenge a federal 
Democratic administration, but this opposition follows from 
partisanship, not from individuals’ state versus federal office as 
such. Indeed, the Massachusetts Democrats will be supported 
by Democrats within the federal government (and opposed by 
Republican officials in other states), while the Texas 
Republicans will be supported by Republicans within the 
federal government (and opposed by Democratic officials in 
other states).30 
Second, states are important sites of national partisan 
competition. While there are always both Democratic and 
Republican politicians in the federal government, the minority 
party has a limited set of tools with which to oppose the 
majority, particularly when it comes to affirmatively advancing 
an agenda rather than engaging in obstructionism. States have 
a different set of tools. Most notably, states have their own 
legislative and executive powers and may rely on their 
regulatory autonomy to advance policies different from those 
favored by the party in power in Washington, D.C. When 
congressional Democrats could not advance climate change or 
stem cell legislation during George W. Bush’s presidency, for 
instance, Democratic states passed laws furthering the 
Democratic agenda.31 When congressional Republicans could 
 
 30. State officials may also be opposed by other officials within their states 
along partisan lines. Consider, for instance, the fights between Democratic 
governors and Republican attorneys general, and Republican governors and 
Democratic attorneys general, about whether to challenge Obamacare. See Kevin 
Sack, In Partisan Battle, Governors Clash with Attorneys General over Lawsuits, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/28/us/politics/ 
28govs.html. 
 31. See, e.g., JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33812, 
CLIMATE CHANGE: ACTION BY STATES TO ADDRESS GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 
(2008) (describing laws passed by Democratic legislatures in California, Hawaii, 
and New Jersey to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and actions by twelve      
other Democratic state legislatures to adopt California’s emissions standards); 
Stem Cell Research, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/ 
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not defund Planned Parenthood or pass voter ID laws during 
Barack Obama’s presidency, Republican states passed laws 
furthering the Republican agenda.32 On partisan lines, state 
officials also make claims that the federal government is 
encroaching on state sovereignty and that certain matters 
should be left to the states. During the Supreme Court’s two 
most recent terms, for example, Republican states challenged 
Obamacare on this ground,33 while Democratic states 
challenged the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).34 
In these and many other instances, we see the significance 
of state autonomy even in the absence of state-federal 
independence. State officials are not carrying out a distinctive 
state mandate, but rather a national partisan agenda, and they 
are supported by federal officials and national groups. 
Members of Congress joined states in their challenges to 
Obamacare and DOMA, for instance, and national networks 
like the American Legislative Exchange Council have drafted a 
variety of state laws.35 There is, here, no meaningful 
independence of state and federal actors; the relevant fault line 
is not state-federal, but Democratic-Republican. Yet state 
autonomy is a critical tool for state and federal actors alike. As 
state autonomy becomes a vehicle for furthering partisan 
commitments, rather than for shoring up state-federal 
separateness, both state and federal actors look to the states as 
critical actors in national politics.36 
 
research/health/embryonic-and-fetal-research-laws.aspx (last updated Jan. 2008) 
(describing laws passed principally by Democratic state legislatures between 2004 
and 2008 to encourage and fund embryonic stem cell research). 
 32. See, e.g., AMS. UNITED FOR LIFE, DEFENDING LIFE 2012, at 37–39 (2012) 
(discussing laws passed by six Republican state legislatures to defund Planned 
Parenthood); Voter Identification Requirements, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/voter-id.aspx#Legislation (last 
updated Oct. 17, 2013) (describing state voter ID laws passed especially by 
Republican state legislatures). 
 33. See Robert N. Weiner, Much Ado: The Potential Impact of the Supreme 
Court Decision Upholding the Affordable Care Act, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE 69 
(Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2013). 
 34. See Response of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in Support of 
Certiorari at 16, Bipartisan Legal Advisory Grp. of the U.S. House of 
Representatives v. Gill, Nos. 12-13, 12-15 (U.S. July 20, 2012); Brief on the Merits 
for New York as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 2, United States v. 
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307). 
 35. See generally Bulman-Pozen, supra note 15, at 1096–1108. 
 36. Individuals throughout the country also look to the states. As I elaborate 
in Partisan Federalism, partisanship leads individuals to identify with and feel 
loyal to the states: Americans may identify with the states not because they 
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There is much more that could be said about this dynamic, 
but let me just note one implication for the long-running debate 
about whether federalism is adequately protected by the 
political process or whether judicial review is necessary.37 Our 
leading account of the political safeguards of federalism argues 
that state politicians will seek to protect state institutional 
prerogatives and that federal officials will defer to these wishes 
because of the ties that bind them to state officials.38 If we take 
politics seriously, however, it is not clear why even state, let 
alone federal, officials will seek to protect state autonomy 
rather than to achieve particular substantive ends; indeed, 
examples abound of state officials welcoming federal 
“encroachment.”39 But if we take politics seriously, it also 
becomes clear why some state and some federal officials 
champion state autonomy—theirs is the party out of power in 
Washington, D.C. It is not that they object to federal power as 
such, but that they object to the partisan ends of a particular 
federal administration.40 On this logic, the political safeguards 
of federalism become bound up in the separation of powers and 
intra-branch dynamics at the federal level.41 The key safeguard 
 
represent something essentially different from the nation, but rather because they 
represent competing Democratic and Republican visions of the national will. And 
such state-based identification is thus particularly important when one’s party is 
out of power in Washington, D.C. See id. at 1108–22. 
 37. Compare, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 
(1985) (recognizing political safeguards of federalism), JESSE H. CHOPER, 
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980) (same), and 
Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States 
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 
543 (1954) (same), with New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (insisting 
on judicial review), United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (same), Steven G. 
Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers”: In Defense of 
United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752 (1995) (same), and John C. Yoo, The 
Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311 (1997) (same). 
 38. See Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political 
Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 282 (2000). 
 39. For instance, the same states that challenged Obamacare as an intrusion 
on state sovereignty supported DOMA as a valid exercise of federal power, while 
those states that challenged DOMA as an intrusion on state sovereignty 
supported Obamacare as a valid exercise of federal power. 
 40. Cf. George A. Krause & Ann Bowman, Adverse Selection, Political Parties, 
and Policy Delegation in the American Federal System, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 359, 
363 (2005) (“[A]s partisan congruence among national level political institutions 
increases, the incentive to shift power to subnational counterparts 
decreases . . . .”). 
 41. Cf. Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard, supra note 14 (considering 
how states affect the balance of power across the branches of the federal 
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of federalism is not the universal relationship between state 
and federal politicians, but rather the role of the minority party 
within the federal government and its ability to advance state 
autonomy. While this change in emphasis does not resolve the 
political safeguards debate, it does suggest a different set of 
questions to be asking. 
III. INTERROGATING AUTONOMOUS ACTION AND INDEPENDENT 
INTERESTS 
Neither autonomy nor independence is a unitary concept, 
as the discussion so far has undoubtedly indicated. Even if we 
bracket different ways to understand each term—a 
heterogeneity I cannot begin to do justice to in this brief 
Essay—and take autonomy to refer to a sphere of state action 
and independence to refer to state officials’ distinctive 
interests, it remains the case that neither autonomy nor 
independence should be understood as an on-off switch. State 
actors may enjoy varying degrees of autonomy and 
independence from their federal counterparts. A project of 
unbundling federalism therefore suggests that we might not 
only pull apart autonomy and independence but also appreciate 
varying degrees of autonomy and independence that may 
underlie state action. Just as we may recognize federalism 
when states advance independent interests without an 
autonomous realm of action and when they use their 
autonomous lawmaking and executive powers to advance 
national interests, so too may we recognize federalism when 
states act with partial but not complete autonomy and 
independence. 
To illustrate this point, let me return to where I began, 
with Colorado’s recent Amendment 64 legalizing marijuana. As 
I have noted, it is tempting to understand this development in 
 
government); Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of 
Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321 (2001) (arguing that the separation of powers 
protects state autonomy by limiting the number and kinds of federal laws that 
may displace state law). Making federal law difficult to enact does not necessarily 
protect state autonomy, as Clark argues; it privileges the legal status quo and 
may thus operate to further federal authority. See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The 
Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Nationalism, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1601 (2008). But the minority party may seek not only to obstruct federal 
lawmaking but also to advance state autonomy, for example by insisting on a 
federal law’s narrow preemptive effect. 
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one of two quite different ways.42 On one account, Amendment 
64 epitomizes both independent and autonomous state action: a 
distinctive community with independent interests seized on the 
state’s autonomous lawmaking capacity to take a position that 
contradicts the federal government’s. On another account, 
however, Amendment 64 epitomizes the absence of state 
independence and autonomy: national organizations and 
individuals outside the state bankrolled the initiative, which 
should be understood as merely an expressive act in light of the 
federal Controlled Substances Act’s continued criminalization 
of marijuana. Unbundling federalism, and recognizing that 
both independence and autonomy admit of degrees, reveals 
that Colorado’s decision is neither a vindication of our 
traditional bundled conception of federalism nor a sign of 
federalism’s demise. It is instead a partially independent, 
partially autonomous state act. 
Start with the question of independent state officials. The 
case for independence is in some respects especially strong: the 
state actors involved were not elected officials but rather the 
people themselves. Because Colorado adopted its legalization 
policy through a ballot initiative, it sidestepped key national 
influences on state action, such as party politics.43 If state 
officials may lack distinctive state interests because of their 
close connections to federal officials and national networks, the 
same is not true when it is the state’s people making the 
legislative choice. And, of course, it was the residents of 
Colorado, not of neighboring Kansas, or Utah, or the United 
 
 42. See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text. 
 43. While the legalization of marijuana appears to have an emerging partisan 
valence—nearly twice as many Democrats as Republicans support legalization, 
and more Democratic than Republican officials in both state and federal 
governments have warmed to the cause, see, e.g., Art Swift, For First Time, 
Americans Favor Legalizing Marijuana, GALLUP (Oct. 22, 2013), http://www. 
gallup.com/poll/165539/first-time-americans-favor-legalizing-marijuana.aspx—it 
is not a partisan issue. Neither the national Democratic nor the national 
Republican party supports legalization, and even in Colorado, the Democratic 
Governor opposed the state legalization initiative. See John Ingold, Colorado Gov. 
John Hickenlooper Opposes Marijuana-Legalization Measure, DENVER POST, Sept. 
13, 2012, http://www.denverpost.com/ci_21530165/colorado-gov-john-hickenlooper-
opposes-marijuana-legalization-measure. The use of a ballot initiative thus 
reflected direct democracy’s earliest aspirations—to create a channel for politics 
beyond partisanship. See, e.g., THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE 
POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 46–48 (1989) (quoting 
Nathan Cree as stating in 1892 that direct democracy was intended “to break the 
crushing and stifling power of our great party machines”). 
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States as a whole, who voted in favor of legalization. 
At the same time, we cannot fully understand Amendment 
64 without attending to its national dimensions. For many 
years now, a variety of national organizations have turned to 
state ballot initiatives to push for the legalization of marijuana. 
In Colorado, the vast majority of funds for Amendment 64 (as 
well as funds opposing it) came from outside the state, as 
Americans nationwide saw the state’s choice as a bellwether for 
national change.44 Staff from national organizations also joined 
the campaign in support of Amendment 64.45 As this suggests, 
the state initiative did not advance an interest particular to 
Coloradans; rather, it advanced an interest shared by many 
Americans. Across the country, individuals and groups both in 
favor of and opposed to legalization of marijuana have 
recognized the state contest not as a local matter with import 
only for the people of Colorado, but as a national contest with 
significance for the entire country. 
They are right to do so. Colorado’s legalization of 
marijuana does not only—in a states-as-laboratories sense46—
generate a model for other states and perhaps the federal 
government to consider. It also has immediate implications for 
national policy because of the relationship between state and 
federal schemes. Here we come to the question of state 
autonomy. As with independence, a degree of state autonomy 
clearly attended Amendment 64. The states and the federal 
government each have their own criminal laws; when state 
officials make an arrest for marijuana distribution or 
possession, they do so as a matter of state law, not in order to 
carry out a federal statute. Colorado’s decision to legalize 
marijuana was therefore, in an important sense, an exercise of 
state autonomy. The state relied on its separate lawmaking 
powers and criminal code to enact a policy different from the 
federal government’s. 
Yet casting state and federal drug law as separate misses 
much about the operation of these laws. The federal 
 
 44. See sources cited supra note 2. 
 45. Compare, e.g., John Ingold, Colorado Marijuana Activists Buttoned    
Down to Win Legalization Measure, DENVER POST, Nov. 11, 2012,          
http://www.denverpost.com/ci_21973903/colorado-marijuana-activists-buttoned-
down-win-legalization-measure, with Staff, NAT’L CANNABIS INDUST. ASS’N, 
http://thecannabisindustry.org/staffs/staff (last visited Feb. 23, 2014). 
 46. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis J., 
dissenting). 
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government has long relied on state enforcement of state law 
as a means of enforcing federal law. In practice, that is, federal 
drug law looks a lot like cooperative federalism: with 99 
percent of arrests for marijuana made by state officials, the 
federal government can rely on state enforcement of state law 
to achieve federal objectives.47 Until it can’t. Colorado’s 
challenge to federal law has force precisely insofar as state and 
federal law are not separate but rather part of a single system. 
If state law truly stood apart from federal law, federal law 
would fill the void left by the state’s initiative, rendering the 
state law merely expressive. But enforcement realities severely 
complicate, even if they do not altogether foreclose, this 
possibility. Colorado’s initiative affects federal law because it is 
effectively a decision to opt out of a cooperative federalism 
scheme. Ultimately, it exemplifies partial autonomy: Colorado 
voters relied on the state’s lawmaking authority, but their 
decision has real bite only because state law is intertwined 
with federal law. 
Amendment 64 is accordingly best understood as a 
partially independent, partially autonomous state act. A 
nationwide movement, with a distinctive but not state-specific 
interest, has generated policy change in a state forum. State-
federal overlap, and in particular federal reliance on state 
enforcement, gives the state law most of its force. The “in-
betweenness” of Colorado’s action highlights a broader point 
about contemporary American federalism: in critical respects, 
national political conflict plays out in the states, with states 
functioning as discrete sites of national governance for 
Americans at large.48 In fifty fora, interests that lack a grip on 
Washington, D.C., are able to translate their political 
commitments into reality, and state action influences the 
federal government in turn. Although understanding the states 
as national actors poses a challenge to traditional, bundled 
conceptions of federalism, it is often the best way to make 
 
 47. See O’Hear, supra note 3, at 806; Karen O’Keefe, State Medical Marijuana 
Implementation and Federal Policy, 16 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 39, 45 (2013); 
see also Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 645 n.10 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., 
concurring) (“[F]ederal officials . . . explained that federal drug policies rely 
heavily on the states’ enforcement of their own drug laws to achieve federal 
objectives.”). 
 48. See generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen, From Sovereignty and Process to 
Administration and Politics: The Afterlife of American Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 
1920 (2014).  
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sense of states’ significance. 
Indeed, while it is too soon to say what will come of 
Colorado’s legalization of marijuana, we seem to be witnessing 
a sort of “reverse preemption”—the displacement of federal law 
by state law49—rather than the preemption of state law by 
federal law.50 Shortly after Amendment 64 was adopted, 
commentators began to question whether the federal 
government would attack Colorado’s law on preemption 
grounds—and whether, if it did so, it would be checked by the 
prohibition on commandeering.51 Less noted in the legal 
hubbub about whether the federal government might succeed 
in an attempt to crack down on Colorado was why it might not 
be in its interest to do so. Even bracketing a possible public 
backlash, officials within the federal government have a 
variety of different views about the criminal status of 
marijuana, and Colorado’s actions created the opportunity for a 
debate to occur inside the federal government. They also gave 
federal officials more options, by putting “deference to state 
law” on the table and thereby lending federal officials a lower-
stakes way to side with legalization.52 Because the state’s 
initiative forced the federal government to make some decision 
about how to respond, it overcame perhaps the most powerful 
force on the side of criminalization: inertia. With support from 
certain actors within the federal government, then, Colorado is 
reshaping federal as well as state drug policy, and Americans 
 
 49. Cf. McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2012) (allowing state 
law to trump the Federal Arbitration Act when state law bars the arbitration of 
insurance disputes); Brief on the Merits for Respondent the Bipartisan Legal 
Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Representatives at 37, United States v. 
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307) (“To be sure, Congress may choose to 
borrow state-law definitions as a matter of cooperative federalism . . . . But the 
notion that Congress is somehow constitutionally required to do so—that state 
law can ‘reverse preempt’ contrary federal statutes in this area, and eliminate 
what otherwise would be the legitimate federal interest in uniform federal legal 
rules of nationwide applicability—is wholly unprecedented and foreign to our 
constitutional tradition.”). 
 50. Cf. Cole, supra note 3 (recognizing state legalization efforts and 
suggesting that the federal government will not devote resources to enforcing the 
federal prohibition on marijuana beyond particular priorities, such as fighting 
criminal gangs and cartels). 
 51. See, e.g., Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Federal Supremacy: When 
States Relax (or Abandon) Marijuana Bans, POLICY ANALYSIS, CATO INST. (Dec. 
12, 2012), http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/PA714.pdf; cf. Conant, 
309 F.3d at 646 (Kozinski, J., concurring) (adopting an anti-commandeering 
argument). 
 52. See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 15, at 1129–30. 
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throughout the country are invested in this experiment, as 
Colorado extends the arena for national governance beyond 
Washington, D.C. While only time will reveal the effects of 
Colorado’s initiative on the United States’ war on drugs, it 
already underscores the need to think more flexibly about 
contemporary federalism. 
 
